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INTRODUCTION
Increasingly, the United States government is realizing the importance of selfreliance. With international security threats rising, energy independence has become
increasingly significant. However, freeing the United States from energy dependence1
may have its drawbacks. Specifically, environmental impacts reign high in priority when
discussing revamping the categories and volume of energy use.
Hybrid vehicles, alternative fuel vehicles, and fuel cell vehicles (hybrid-type
vehicles) have been cited as significant tools, which could be used to combat the current
energy entanglement while at the same time remaining conscious of and accountable to
environmental risks. The National Energy Policy Development Group concluded that
“[w]ith forward-looking leadership and sensible policies, we can meet our future energy
demands and promote energy conservation, and do so in environmentally responsible
ways that set a standard for the world.”2 Through President George W. Bush’s
commitment to energy security and environmental protection, the Congress and the states
have attempted to use hybrid-type vehicles to their full advantage via tax credits and
other incentives.
Nevertheless, continuity in environmental policy and stability in tax policy have
suffered because the overall plan for energy independence has followed a disheveled
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path. Competing agendas have counter-acted the intended effectiveness of tax credit and
incentive programs for energy efficiency.
This paper will discuss the above tax credits and incentives and attempt to
demonstrate how they have been and continue to be ineffective due policy disruptions via
congressional and executive inaction, nominal action, and competing policies. Part one
will discuss the general principles behind American environmental policy and
environmental policy as a whole. Part two will discuss tax policy within the United States
and its potential impact on social, economic and consumer demand. Part three will
discuss hybrid vehicles, alternative fuel vehicles, fuel cell vehicles and fuel economy
within the United States tax and environmental agendas. Part four will attempt to show
how the interplay between the current tax scheme and the environmental and energy
goals within the United States hinders the development and success of each. Finally, part
five will conclude that the current and proposed energy programs of the United States
disregard fundamental environmental and tax policy norms, which make them
ineffective.

I.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

Achieving successful policy in any area requires three conditions to be met. There
must be an alternative for the current state of affairs, there must be an ability to pay for
the implementation of the alternative, and there must be a set of values willing to accept
change.3
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TALES OF ENVIRONMENTAL DECEPTION

One of the main tenets of environmental policy is achieving a quality of life
whereby the citizens of a given place can live healthy and productive lives. Development
that is combined with environmental policies has been described as “sustainable
development.” It “requires a holistic and comprehensive approach to air quality, and one
that is incorporated into decision making for production and consumption decisions from
the start.”4 Instead of concentrating on each pollutant individually (an atomistic
approach), which has thus far been the case, many environmentalists are focusing on
sustainable development as a new (possibly more politically correct) method of
addressing environmental concerns.

Sustainable development provides not only for

environmental concerns at the expense of economic needs, but it integrates economic
factors into the dialogue in order to obtain a truly comprehensive and maintainable
policy.5
Those formulating environmental policy (politicians, lobbyists, environmental
organizations, think tanks, etc.) look at the environment from varying perspectives when
using the traditional atomistic perspective. Thus, environmental organizations are
primarily concerned with pollution and its effects on the environment, while various
lobbyists are primarily concerned with specific economic issues arising out of
environmental legislation and regulation.
The move to sustainable development has helped to create a unity of thought, if
not a unity of ideas, amongst many divergent groups. Environmentalists still desire
reparative action and business persons still promote cost-effectiveness; however
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recognition of the need for an alternative before policy is set has become universal. This
alternative does not have to exist at the present, but it must be feasible in the future.
This idea enables the economy to progress and even flourish because
environmental concerns can be addressed and business can have feeling of certainty.
Business could not continue if any perceived environmental ill could halt production or
use of a given product without presenting a possible alternative.6 On the other hand,
environmental ills would seldom be remedied if available technology were the standard
for permitting action. As a result, technology-forcing legislation and regulations can be
promulgated without fears of catastrophic economic loss when environmental needs
require and when technology may be developed to cure the malady.
Even when the alternative is available or may be made available in the near
future, prohibitive cost can be a limiting factor in implementing environmental policy.
For example, the Energy Policy Act of 2003 requires federal agencies to use alternative
fuels instead of regular gasoline in dual-fueled vehicles, but this requirement may be
waived by the Secretary of Energy if “the cost of the alternative fuel otherwise required
to be used in the vehicle is unreasonably more expensive compared to gasoline.”7 This
requirement points to the economic and political realities of environmental reform. The
American government promotes the environment to the extent that it can within its own
security requirements; economic viability both nationally and internationally remains one
of its major security concerns.8
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Likewise, even where an alternative is readily available and the cost is relatively
low or non-existent, an environmental policy will not remain practicable if it is not
buttressed by political will. As Devra Davis noted, in When Smoke Ran Like Water, in
referring to the formation of the EPA and the 1970 Clean Air Act, “1971 looks like the
high-water mark of government sympathy to environmental causes. Politicians of all
stripes accepted the need for action by the federal government.”9 Air pollution at that
time was becoming a significant problem as smog began to engulf American cities. Just
as in any area of policy-making, nothing would be done without someone or some group
promoting its institution; and further, that promotion has to be of a broad enough
character for implementation to ensue.

II.

TAX POLICY

There are many reasons for and against taxes, but one of the main purposes is to
promote policy agendas. Tax policy is founded on the ideals of efficiency and equity,
which are both supplemented by the political will of “the individuals who are
instrumental in shaping tax policy.”10 As with environmental policy,
The tax system is not designed by a benevolent overseer who considers only the equity
and efficiency aspects of taxation but rather is produced through a political system in
which individuals have the opportunity to express their personal preferences, which often
will be motivated more out of personal interest than a concern that the tax system,
11
overall, be efficient and equitable.
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Still, “[t]hese days, however, no one is ready to propose new taxes on anything.”12 With
the economy attempting to recover, policy-makers are apprehensive of derailing the
economic improvement by imposing new taxes too soon.13
Tax credits and other incentives, on the other hand may be seen as motivating
factors in promoting new policy. In times of recession, an increase in disposable income
through credits and deductions can increase investment and spending thereby aiding in
revitalization. Moreover, this same potential increase in disposable income can greatly
increase the government’s ability to influence decisions of taxpayers.
These tax credits and incentives approximate a negative sumptuary tax scheme as
they indirectly prohibit one product or activity through substituting out the non-favored
activity for the favored one. This is especially true in the case where the activity sought
to be encouraged is promoted for reasons other than efficiency and equity. For example,
Adam Smith noting irregular (but acceptable) motivations for an alcohol “sin” tax stated,
“The consumption of ardent spirits particularly, no doubt very much on account of their
cheapness, is carried on to an extreme, which is truly to be regretted, as well in regard to
the health and morals, as to the economy of the community.”14 The nature of these types
of taxes as ‘penalties’ gives them credence and acceptance since policy-makers are
willing and politically able to endorse them.
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A.

Efficiency in Tax Policy
The costs of tax policy have typically been thought of in two ways: shifting tax to

different taxpayers and the excess burden of the said tax. An excise tax (such as a tax on
gasoline) may be shifted from one taxpayer to another based upon the economic dynamic
of their relationship. “A tax placed on suppliers in market [sic.] can be partially shifted to
demanders and a tax placed on demanders can be partially shifted to supplies [sic.], so
that in either case, suppliers and demanders end up sharing the burden of the tax.”15 This
is not the case with vehicle fuels.
In normal situations, the amount paid by the demander and the amount received
by the supplier, including taxes, are equalized despite who was taxed at the outset. For
example, if a $100 excise tax were placed on the supplier of wheat to a baker, the $100
should be added to the price of the wheat, thus creating a situation where both parties
bear the tax burden. However, when the relative elasticities16 of supply and demand are
accounted for, the burden can be shifted proportionately to one party or the other. The
inelastic nature of wheat demand (assuming uniform price increases and necessity of
wheat) should mean that if the price increases, the demand for wheat would remain
relatively steady due to its necessity. This dynamic would force the cost of the tax from
the wheat producer to the baker who is unable to forego demanding the wheat.
In addition, costs of a good may be increased through the excess burden of
taxation, which “arises because the taxpayers not only must pay the tax to the
government, but also will alter their behavior in response to a tax to avoid the tax to some
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degree.”17 When a taxpayer alters his conduct in order to avoid tax, the government
(thus, society) fails to benefit from the tax that would have been paid if the behavior was
not modified. To minimize this cost, “one of the goals of tax policy is to minimize the
excess burden of the tax.”18 This can be accomplished by placing a tax on a good with a
relatively inelastic demand, such as the wheat in the above example or oil; there, the
consumer has no alternative but to purchase the good thereby paying the tax.
B.

Equity in Tax Policy
When designing tax policy, two principles of equity are usually taken into account

to various degrees; these are the benefit principle and the ability-to-pay principle. “The
benefit principle states that the people who benefit from the government’s expenditures
should be the ones who pay for them.”19 This principle is almost like a use-tax for
government services. If a taxpayer receives benefit from the service, it is felt that he
should pay for it, just as he would have to pay for a service from a company. “[T]he
charges act as a rationing device” when services and facilities get congested.20
“The overall tax system is strongly oriented toward the benefit principle,”
however its use is limited by the application of the ability-to-pay principle, which applies
most often where the intended beneficiary of the tax is not a clearly definable person or
entity.21 This principle is founded on the idea that there is a correlation between the
benefits derived from government and income/wealth.22 A problem then arises in respect
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to the amount of tax to be imposed on those with the ability to pay. The concepts of
horizontal and vertical equity attempt to address this.
Horizontal equity means that persons and entities in the same economic situation
should pay the same amount of tax, and vertical equity entails those of greater economic
ability paying proportionately more than those of less ability.

III.

A.

HYBRID VEHICLES, ALTERNATIVE FUEL VEHICLES,
FUEL CELL VEHICLES AND FUEL ECONOMY

Vehicles
Due to the size of the United States, its ever-sprawling cities and the American

obsession with the automobile, “approximately 65 percent of the oil consumed in the
United States is used for transportation.”23 This puts a strain on its ability to be selfsufficient on the energy front. Only 40 percent of oil consumption is from American
sources; the rest comes mostly from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) cartel.24 But while the lack of energy independence can stifle American national
security and its economy, alternative fuel vehicles and hybrid vehicles are whittling away
at this reliance. By 2001, there were “450,000 alternative fuel vehicles in the United
States, and more than 1.5 million flexible-fuel vehicles that can use gasoline or a mixture
of ethanol and gasoline.”25
This is, in part, due to the current tax and environmental policies implemented by
the Secretary of the Treasury and the Administrators of the Environmental Protection
Agency and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). Section 30
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of the Internal Revenue Code provides a tax credit for the purchase of alternative fuel or
low-emission vehicles.26

This credit, although non-refundable, reduces a taxpayer’s

adjusted gross income by up to $4,000 in 2003, $3,000 in 2004, $2,000 in 2005, and
$1,000 in 2006.27 In addition, each automobile manufacturer must establish what is
called Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) for certain parts of their vehicle fleets.
The average fuel efficiency of all passenger vehicles and light trucks weighing less than
8,500 lbs. that a manufacturer sells must meet 27.5 miles per gallon for a passenger
vehicle and 20.7 miles per gallon for a light truck.28 Vehicles above 8,500 lbs. are
exempt from the CAFE program.29 Although these policies have permitted alternative
fuel vehicles and hybrid vehicles to enter the market place, many of these same policies
have impeded the full possibility of the use of such vehicles.
B.

Proposals
i.

National Energy Policy

Vice President Richard Cheney presented the National Energy Policy to President
Bush on May 16, 2001. It precipitated the submission of the Energy Policy Act of 2003,
Senate Bill 2095, (among others) due to its reformative stance and forward-looking
approach. At the same time, it was widely criticized because of its open posture on
energy development,30 such as the promotion of full exploitation of marginal oil wells
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within the United States.31 The criticism that has arisen is not well-founded in that the
policy makes the environment an important and pivotal role in the use and generation of
energy.
Even before September 11, 2001, the Bush administration was concerned with
security of the American economy and way of life; it hoped to maintain these through
reducing the United States’ dependence on foreign energy sources.32 Coordinate with this
plan, the environment was called the “third challenge” for the energy policy.33
One of the main methods of meeting this challenge was to develop and implement
alternative fuel, fuel cell, and hybrid fuelled vehicles. These vehicles were to be
promoted through the expansion of “existing alternative fuels tax incentives.”34 The
administration states that “[o]ne of the factors harming the environment today is the very
lack of a comprehensive, long-term national energy policy.”35 There must be reliable,
affordable, and environmentally sound energy supplies, but they will not be reached
overnight. Nevertheless, the oratory nature of the National Energy Policy coupled with
the politics of the legislative process have reduced its comprehensive and long-term goals
by creating non-contemplated short-term incentives and long-term disincentives.
ii.

Energy Policy Act of 2003

Senate Bill 2095, the Energy Policy Act of 2003, is a compilation of Congress’
efforts since the announcement of the National Energy Policy in 2001 and is attempting
to execute a comprehensive and forward-looking energy policy. Its goals are grand and
31
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in many ways remarkable in their bipartisanship,36 but the continued rehashing of the
many bills and their metamorphosis into S. 2095 have reduced the Bill’s efficacy,
nullifying its value.

IV.

ANALYSIS

The question becomes what the real policy regarding the convergence of energy
and the environment in the automotive sphere has become, and whether the policy is
efficacious. In addition, “to fully appreciate the overall effect of the tax system, taxes
must be viewed collectively” and in light of their effect on environmental policy.37 In the
case of hybrid-type vehicles, energy policy collides with environmental and tax policy
thereby diminishing the effectiveness of both tax policy and environmental policy in the
area of energy regulation.
A.

ADVERSITY TO ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
i.

Alternative to Low Efficiency, Gas-Powered Vehicles

Arguably, the alternative to low efficiency, gas-powered vehicles has not arrived
yet. And, there is some doubt as to whether fuel cell vehicles will ever be commercially
viable or whether electric vehicles produce an environmental benefit at all.38 However,
commercially viable hybrid vehicles such as the Honda Insight and the Toyota Prius have
been introduced recently and more are expected to follow including a Sport Utility
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Vehicle (SUV), the Ford Escape Hybrid, which is expected to reach the showroom floor
with 38 miles per gallon efficiency in August 2004.39
In addition, even if certain vehicles were not viable options, others are in
development.40 Technology can and does advance; the United States Congress and the
President are attempting to facilitate this. As an example of technological advancement,
stratospheric ozone depletion was addressed by “banning the most problematic
production patterns, thereby creating substantial incentives to move toward more
sustainable patterns of development.”41 The same has been happening in the field of
emissions control where newer, more efficient vehicles have been developed, which
produce fewer harmful emissions.42
However, since technology is evolving continuously, it is difficult to judge what
its future will hold, and even more difficult to make policy regarding what the future
might bring with it. Both the National Energy Policy and the Energy Policy Act of 2003
indicate that any technology proposed or required by environmental policy needs to be
“technically practicable.”43 These policies are well-structured to enable the use of readily
available or nearly available technology, but the terms “technically practicable” permit
the possibility of a broad interpretation. Thus, “practicable” becomes politicized, and the
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energy policy that would have had wide-ranging and far-reaching impacts on improving
the energy supply of the United States and maintaining its environment becomes nominal
and simply rhetoric.
For example, the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards that
require vehicle manufacturers to ensure that their fleet of vehicles has an average fuel
efficiency of a certain level. At the moment, passenger vehicles are required to maintain
27.5 miles per gallon and light trucks are required to maintain 21.0 miles per gallon fuel
efficiency.44 There has been a standing controversy over the extent to which the CAFE
standards should be increased, if at all.45 This has largely hinged on the characterization
of current technology levels and the potential availability of subsequent models and
features, and these debates largely rely on cost projections which are glossed by the
political atmosphere.
ii.

Cost of High Efficiency Hybrid-Type Vehicles

It is clear that “[p]erhaps the greatest barrier to growth of renewable energy is
cost.”46 This is accurate for any type of non-traditional energy source, such as alternative
fuels and fuel cells, and it holds true with the implementation of hybrid vehicle
technology as well. A main reason that new technologies are slow to be adopted is cost;
“[b]ecause of the large economies of scale in automobile manufacturing, new
technologies with limited early production runs often enter the market at higher initial
costs.”47

44
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The National Energy Policy recognizes the reality that component costs must be
reduced and demand must be increased.48 This is especially true with new technology
such as hybrid and fuel cell vehicles where a premium is attached to every new product.49
The average gas-electric hybrid vehicle currently costs $4,000 more than the equivalent
non-hybrid vehicle,50 which makes cost ever more important in using them as an aspect
of the implementation of environmentally sound energy policy.
That cost can take years to offset through lower gasoline costs.51 It is difficult for
consumers to justify paying the operation costs up-front. These front-loaded costs may
make the perceived costs to the consumer seem even higher, thus dissuading the average
individual or corporation from purchasing such a product.52 Concurrently, the consumer
unwillingness to internalize front-loaded costs may limit initial demand and result in
limited preliminary production runs.
Many of these deficiencies may be combated with activities that attempt to create
and preserve economies of scale.

“Properly designed subsidies and incentive

programs…can transition industries into commercial maturity.”53 Current policy had
attempted to provide these subsidies and incentives, but the current presidential and
congressional administrations have attempted to improve upon it. However, they have
not efficiently targeted the supply and demand sides of the market.

48

NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY, supra note 2, at 4-10.
Ford Escape Hybrid FAQs, FORD MOTOR COMPANY, available at
http://www.fordvehicles.com/escapehybrid/faqs/index.asp?bhcp=1#faq17 (last visited April 13, 2004).
50
See Ford CEO, supra note 39 (quoting a survey by J.D. Power and Associates).
51
Id.
52
Compare Mark Detsky, The Global Light: An Analysis of International and Local Developments in the
Solar Electric Industry and Their Lessons for United States Energy Policy, 14 COLO. J. INT’L ENVT’L L. &
POLICY 301, 303 (Spring 2003).
53
Id.
49

15

a.

Demand

Current attempts to increase consumer demand rely on tax credits for the purchase
of hybrid vehicles.54 However, these credits have two drawbacks: they are limited in
amount and they phase out after 2006. The credits are limited to $4,000 for 2003, $3,000
in 2004, $2,000 in 2005, $1,000 in 2006, and $0 thereafter.55 The credit is insufficient to
offset the front-loaded new technology cost that averages $4,000 because although it
equals that cost in 2003, its effectiveness is stripped from it yearly thereafter.
In addition, the $4,000 average cost differential only applies to high-efficiency,
gasoline-powered vehicles. President Bush’s new fuel cell initiative drastically increases
the potential costs and limits the ability of consumer demand to create the needed
economies of scale to make the project cost-effective. Certain hybrids and fuel cell
vehicles are prohibitively expensive at this stage in their development. For example, the
RAV4 zero emission vehicle produced by Toyota currently costs the automaker
approximately $200,000 to produce; it is virtually built by hand.56 Although, Toyota and
Honda currently incur losses on their hybrid vehicles,57 they cannot be expected to bear
that expense forever, and that loss will limit their willingness to increase production and
thereby economies of scale.

Without an increase in the credit amount, the cost of

creating these next-generation vehicles will not permit implementation of the
administrations’ environmentally conscious energy policy.
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Furthermore, the sunset provision of § 30 will emasculate it even further as there
will be no method to offset the front-loaded costs. It is possible that the technology
premium will be time-limited and not require an offset, but as these technologies are
completely new, further developments and additional technology premiums will likely be
imposed by manufacturers in order to recoup their developmental costs.
The Energy Tax Incentives Act, which is proposed by Senate Bill 2095 attempts
to augment the credits currently available by extending the sunset provision for hybrid
vehicles until 2007 and creating a fuel cell specific credit which extends until 2011. The
one year extension of the hybrid credit is insufficient as the technology will likely
progress at a rate which requires hybrid technology to be promoted until at least 2020.
This would be more valuable because hybrid technology has been said to be a stop-gap
for energy needs while fuel cell technology is perfected,58 and fuel cell technology may
require an additional ten years in a best-case scenario and potentially another ten years
after that should technological hurdles arise.59
Actually, while the Energy Tax Incentives Act creates a separate fuel cell vehicle
tax credit of $4,000 for most passenger vehicles, the hybrid credit would be lowered to a
quarter of that for passenger vehicles.

While this might be perfectly logical were

Congress, in fact, intent on using hybrid vehicles as a stop-gap until fuel cells were
developed as a means of encouraging hybrid vehicles over gasoline-only vehicles, but
encouraging fuel cell over hybrid vehicles.
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However, that lowered cost-retrieval system produces an incongruous effect since
there are no fuel cell vehicles with commercial production capabilities at the moment. In
fact, the automakers are still perfecting hybrid vehicle technology as evidenced by their
reluctance to admit the feasibility of SUV hybrids until the Ford Escape Hybrid’s
introduction at the New York Auto Show on April 12, 2004.60 Therefore, hybrid vehicle
incentives will sunset too early and cause a regression to low-efficiency gasoline powered
vehicles instead of providing the desired stepping stone to fuel cell vehicles.
Moreover, the true cost of high-efficiency vehicles comes to light when viewed in
terms of the tax credits, granted by § 30, which pale in comparison to the deductions
which are available for certain heavier, low-efficiency gasoline vehicles. Section 179
permits business deductions of up to $100,000 for the purchase of many of the largest
SUVs, those weighing more than $8,500 lbs.61 While this deduction may be recaptured
by the Secretary of the Treasury if used for a non-business vehicle,62 the major
manufacturers are now billing these vehicles as fully tax deductible.63
The effect of these deductions is to create a perceived cost to buying a smaller,
high efficiency vehicle. The credit that was designed to promote the purchase of hybridtype vehicles actually alerts some consumers to their true cost when compared to the lowefficiency vehicle deductions, thereby preserving the idea of the high-cost of fuel
efficiency. This impression remains valid even in the event that a consumer would not
have qualified for the business deduction.
60
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b.

Supply

In addition, consumers will only be willing to internalize the front-loaded costs of
a hybrid-type vehicle. This leaves manufacturers to bear the remaining economic burden
associated with research, development, and production of completely new technology. It
is uncertain whether automakers are capable of bearing this burden,64 but certain
programs can combine light coercion with incentives to promote and achieve the
production and sale of fuel cell and hybrid vehicles.
The National Energy Policy and the Energy Policy Act of 2003 (Senate Bill 2095)
would provide market incentives in order to promote hybrid-type vehicles by mandating
that certain fleets of vehicles (government fleets and particular corporate fleets of more
than 20 vehicles that are centrally fuelled or leased) purchase hybrid type vehicles.65 If
successful, these fleets would enable the manufacturers to establish economies of scale in
order to bring the cost of hybrid-type vehicles down and even increase consumer demand
as well. Of course, this would depend on the incentive programs adhering to consistent
inducements and encouragements, which is not the case.
Since cost is the prime motivator of business activity, the intended market will not
be created if these fleet incentives are counter-acted by opposing policies. The costconscious business and governmental fleet operator would engage in behavior which
would skirt their obligations to purchase hybrid-type vehicles because § 703 of the
Energy Policy Act of 2003 allows for credit against the amount of hybrid-type vehicles
required to be purchased where the fleet operator purchases medium or heavy duty

64

Elizabeth Rigby, Ford to Reinstate Managers’ Bonuses, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2004, at 21 (discussing the
fact that Ford is only recently bouncing back from a period of “heavy losses,” where it cut jobs, matching
contributions to pension funds, and management bonuses).
65
Energy Policy Act of 2003, S. 2095 at § 703.

19

trucks.

A fleet operator purchasing a vehicle weighing over 14,000 lbs. would be

allowed three credits, with each credit being treated as the purchase of one hybrid-type
vehicle that the operator is required to purchase. The purchase of a vehicle weighing
over 8,500 lbs. would permit two credits. In this manner, the economic incentive to
purchase hybrid-type vehicles (and thereby create a larger market) would be eviscerated
simply by the purchase of SUVs similar to the Chevrolet Suburban.66 This renders the
fleet requirement even more impotent in encouraging fuel economy and efficient vehicles
because the manufacturers of these vehicles are not required to abide by CAFE standards
that would apply to lighter passenger vehicles within the fleet.67
Furthermore, this situation would provide an easier incentive to manufacturers
who have already fought modernization and improvement of their vehicles at every step
of the way68 since the imposition of efficiency standards to continue their pattern of
obstinacy. This alternative would permit manufacturers to offer incentives to fleets to
purchase bigger vehicles as well as to allow automotive dealers to put bigger vehicles
into lease service and still receive hybrid-type vehicle credits.
Likewise, Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) requirements mandate that
passenger vehicles and light trucks average a certain fuel efficiency level.69

These

standards create a sumptuary tax on inefficient vehicles; thus a sin tax is imposed on
manufacturers to the extent they produce and sell too many inefficient vehicles. If that
were the extent of the program, there would be economic incentive to effectuate the
environmental and energy goals of increased efficiency.
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Alas, that is not the case and would not be the case were the National Energy
Policy implemented or if the Energy Policy Act of 2003 were enacted as legislation. The
NHTSA would effect changes in the CAFE requirement as it has in the past.70 However,
it did not change the mandate until recently for light trucks and did not change it for
passenger vehicles.

Thus the effectiveness of the CAFE program is limited; fleet

efficiency peaked in 1988 for passenger vehicles and in 1987 for light trucks. The
NHTSA has set the standard too low,71 which has distorted the market, so that once the
efficiency requirements of 1975 were met, no further improvements had to be made. The
sumptuary tax of penalties for non-compliance, which was supposed to encourage
efficiency, was unable to effectuate change and unable to play any role at all in providing
an economic benefit for bringing about the environmental aspects of the energy policy.
The National Energy Policy purported to recommend increased standards by
having the NHTSA set the fuel economy level; however, the need to conserve energy and
effects on fuel economy were only part of the equation considered. As a result, the
CAFE levels stagnated under political pressure from the automotive manufacturers.72
The desired “high standards” have not materialized and would not materialize under the
current proposals, so market incentives (a central point in the President’s Energy
Policy)73 have not played a role in creating market forces to determine the most effective
way to meet the standards.
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iii.

Political Will
Before any environmental policy is implemented, “[congress] must be willing to

assign the private sector, rather than government, the responsibility to reconcile
environmental goals with economic development.”74 That is, in the fuel efficiency realm,
automobile manufacturers must determine the level of economic development versus the
level of environmental protection that Congress has mandated. Congress’ limited role in
the promotion of environmental policy has been to designate market-based incentives and
technology-forcing incentives in order to enable the economic sector to determine the
most efficient method of meeting environmental standards.
a.

Market-Based Incentives

In many cases, there is not a great enough political will behind a policy that will
continue for any great length of time. This puts environmental legislation particularly
precarious position, since it is needed in many cases and will need to be updated.
Market-based incentives may augment the current political will and create an ongoing
interest in the subject.
The current CAFE standards are set by the Administrator of the NHTSA, as stated
above; and the automobile manufacturers have believed (in many cases) that they can
influence the decisions of the administrator through political pressure.75 It has been
difficult to gain their support due to the costs imposed by requiring greater fuel
efficiency, and their tremendous influence stemming from their control of more than 6.6
million American jobs has limited the ability of the Administrator to increase efficiency
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requirements.76 From 1996 to 2001 (covering model years 1998 to 2003), Congress acted
to restrain NHTSA from increasing the fuel efficiency.77
Market incentives can function well; however, they can only operate as well as
they are monitored, and they must be set at levels sufficient to provide incentives.
Senator Kerry (D., Mass.) and Senator McCain (R., Ariz.) attempted to accomplish that
by proposing a significantly higher CAFE standard of 35 miles per gallon for both light
trucks and passenger vehicles.78 They were met with particularly strong opposition by
opponents from automobile manufacturing states who accused Senators Kerry and
McCain of striving to increase unemployment.79 In persuading the Senate to adopt their
proposal, that the NHTSA continue to monitor efficiency, Senators Bond (R., MO) and
Levin (R., MI) conjured up images of long caravans of golf carts taking children to
soccer practice.80
The images of higher unemployment and lack of availability of larger vehicles
enabled the current bill, S. 2095, to include a watered down provision that grants the
NHTSA the power to set the maximum feasible average fuel economy.81 The NHTSA
must fully take into account economic practicability and the effects of compliance on
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automobile industry employment levels.

The NHTSA determined CAFE levels are

significantly lower than Senator Kerry’s proposal of 35 miles per gallon even though the
National Academy of Science (NAS) determined that 35 miles per gallon was
economically feasible in light of employment levels.82 Moreover, while Senator Kerry
has given the 35 mpg standard as feasible within the scientific limits set by the NAS,
Senators Levin and Bond have quoted all three big American automobile manufacturers
(Daimler-Chrysler, General Motors, and Ford) stating that the only place to find SUVs
would be in museums and that “CAFE is a job killer.”83
It is obviously difficult to overcome rhetoric of that type especially if it is
seemingly supported by scientific or economic datum. However, that rhetoric does not
comport with the National Energy Policy’s goals of self-sufficiency in the energy realm,
nor does it comport with environmental concerns addressed by the National Energy
Policy. Just a three mpg increase in fuel efficiency would save 1 million gallons of oil
per day in consumption.84 This would more than offset the recent OPEC cut of exactly 1
million barrels of oil per day.85
The political will is not behind the imposition of higher efficiency standards and it
is also not behind the credits for hybrid-type vehicles. The debate has been framed
between American and foreign automobile manufacturers.86 The question has been asked
whether one would give foreign manufacturers the jobs lost to domestic manufacturers.87
It is difficult to deny the strength of over 6 million workers and this is the political
82
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question behind the debate, but the fact is that the point of market-based incentives is to
set standards high and permit “market forces to determine the most effective way to meet
them.”88 This cannot happen in the current political atmosphere, where the automobile
manufacturers and their state representatives have shifted the political wind to make
people fear dire economic impacts of greater fuel efficiency or alternative fuel vehicles.
b.

Technology Forcing Incentives

The National Energy Policy also looks to promote better technologies through its
language, but these words seem mostly nominal. In the same breathe, the Policy cautions
that “development of new-car production models requires at least three to four years,
which limits the rate at which new technologies can enter the market.”89 It goes on to say,
“Once those new vehicles are in the showroom, it then takes several more years before
they constitute any sizeable percentage of total vehicles.”90 This seems to signify that
even though there is an immense incentive for the country to encourage increased
efficiency and alternative fuels, it will not happen for a while. In which case, the phaseouts of the current tax credits seem even more ridiculous. The National Energy Policy
states that there should be credits for the purchase of hybrid-type vehicles until 2007,91
and S. 2095 mirrors that proposal, but that only extends the current scheme by one year.
If hybrid-type vehicles are to be true stepping-stones to fuel cell vehicles, they
must be encouraged in a manner that would both encourage their production and
encourage their consumption. The United States government spent nearly $8 Billion on
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its vehicles in 1999,92 which would equal 320,000 vehicles at $25,000 each. Currently,
there are only 450,000 alternative fuel vehicles in the United States.93 Thus, requiring
further technological efficiency enhancements in vehicle fleets would cause a economic
burden, but were the United States government to be truly committed to the prospect of
fuel efficiency, it would attempt to offset these burdens through essentially doubling the
alternative fuel vehicles on the road with only one year’s vehicle acquisitions. The
CAFE standards, if set too low, only serve to counter-act the sumptuary tax nature of the
penalties, and thereby lessening the political will to improve technology.

The

technology-forcing incentives would merely be technology-hoping incentives, if there
were any incentive at all.
B.

ADVERSITY TO TAXATION POLICY
“Contemporary economists would describe a tax intended to discourage

consumption of a specific commodity as adjusting for a negative externality.94 Those
costs regarding efficient vehicles would involve the environmental dangers and damages
posed by low-efficiency gasoline vehicles. They are not easily determined,95 but the
fundamental tax policy goals of efficiency and equity may enable one to bring the
question of cost more into view.
i.

Efficiency

“The thrust is on the need for policy coordination so as to prevent destructive
competition taking place which erodes and eliminates tax bases.”96 Unless there is some
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cooperative arrangement jointly developed by competing levels of government, harm will
be done.”97 The tax policy regarding hybrid and alternative fuel incentives has fomented
this “destructive competition,” and it has reduced the efficiency of these measures
dramatically.
Demand for oil is relatively constant (inelastic); even when prices are high drivers
consume at the same rate. This is exemplified by the fact that while current prices are at
near record highs, sales and use of Recreational Vehicles (RVs) have hit unprecedented
levels.98 Because demand is so constant, the tax burden is shifted to those vehicle
purchasers who choose to continue to buy non-hybrid/non-alternative fuel vehicles. They
do not receive a tax credit, and the extra cost of purchasing a vehicle with no tax credit is
fully attributed to the purchaser and not dispersed equally through the manufacturer,
distributor and purchaser.
The low fuel cost will not engage these consumers to purchase a hybrid-type
vehicle because average fuel efficiency has a low priority in vehicle selection. Other
factors such as vehicle safety, towing capacity, load capacity, and overall size weigh
more heavily in their decision to choose a larger non-hybrid-type vehicle.
In addition, the credit will not change such a purchasing choice because it merely
brings the price of a hybrid-type vehicle down to the price of a similar non-hybrid
vehicle. The price is not lower, even including a credit. For example, a typical hybrid
vehicle costs more than a comparable non-hybrid, but the credit is only $4,000 for now.
And, any effect the current credit might have on consumption of hybrid vehicles would
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be short-lived, as the current credit is set to expire December 31, 2006 and proposed
hybrid vehicle credits are designed to phase-out in 2007.
The inefficiency continues due to the availability of other tax options for nonhybrid-type vehicles. Even though demand is inelastic in terms of gasoline demand,
vehicle model demand is relatively inelastic within a given class of vehicles (e.g. SUVs).
The current tax structure provides tax deductions for certain SUVs that meet vehicle
weight requirements. These deductions are not anticipated to end with the proposed
legislation, but they are limited in that they may not be taken if the applicable SUV
deductions are taken under Internal Revenue Code §§ 179 or 179A.99
This means that indirect tax imposed on non-hybrid-type vehicles through
offering an incentive to purchase hybrid-type vehicles increases the excess burden and
thus the inefficiency of the tax system. Where a vehicle purchaser would either pay tax
or create “permissible”100 excess burden if an SUV deduction did not exist, the
inefficiencies of the system would be limited to shifting the burden fully to the purchaser.
However, the inefficiency is exacerbated by permitting the consumer to purchase a
vehicle with the opposite effect as that desired by the policy behind the hybrid-type tax
credits. The consumer is persuaded, by the tax realities, to purchase an SUV with lower
fuel efficiency due to the fact that he might receive a deduction valued as much as ten
times as much as the tax credit available for hybrid-type vehicles.101
Furthermore, under the proposed Energy Policy Act of 2003, certain
governmental and commercial fleets would be required to purchase a particular
99
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percentage of hybrid-type vehicles to facilitate the government’s program of providing a
market for such vehicles.102

This would seem logical and efficient in terms of

implementing the policy of facilitating the manufacturing and use of fuel efficient
vehicles; however Fleet Credits would be available to offset any need to purchase hybridtype vehicles. For every heavy duty vehicle (14,000lbs. or more) purchased, three credits
would be issued and for every medium duty vehicle purchased, two credits would be
issued.103 Each credit would be treated “as the acquisition of 1 alternative fueled vehicle
that the fleet or required individual is required to purchase.”104
ii.

Equity

The federal government spends money through credits for hybrid vehicles, and
potentially will be incurring costs by implementing alternative fuel and fuel cell vehicle
credits. With equity as part-in-parcel of tax policy, it is necessary to determine its role
within credits for these hybrid-type vehicles.
The benefit of such a credit can aptly be described as benefiting the United States
in general, and individual vehicle purchasers. The country is benefited through increased
national security due to decreased dependence on foreign oil and bolstered economy
through assurance of a stable energy source and by promoting technological
development, and individual purchasers are benefited through the tax credits themselves.
Identifying the benefits granted through said tax credits, permits one to determine
that their true effect creates an indirect use-tax for gas and clean air because it lowers the
tax of those purchasing hybrid-type vehicles and forces those purchasers of non-hybridtype vehicles to bear a higher increased tax burden. The purchasers of non-hybrid-type
102
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vehicles do not receive a decreased adjusted taxable income by virtue of the purchase of
that vehicle.
However, the government does not want to discourage use of oil or vehicles;105 it
merely wants more efficient use.106 An excessively high burden on the use of energy or
vehicles can slow the economy.107 The whole point of efficient energy use, though, is to
promote sound economic policy to encourage market development.
As important as which taxpayer is benefited from a specific tax policy is which as
the ability to pay. This is especially true when the intended beneficiary is not clearly
definable, as here (benefits of national security and economic stability inure in the
general population). And, tax policy attempts to rectify the coordinate disconnect in the
benefit principle, but both current energy policy and proposals for change have missed
the mark.
Credits for hybrid-type vehicles by themselves might be permissible under ideal
tax policy, but the overall schedule of credits and incentives works against this. In most
cases, a hybrid-type vehicle will cost more (even including the credited amount) than an
equivalent non-hybrid-type vehicle. In addition, the current tax scheme permits the credit
to expire in 2006108 which thereby increases the inequity by forcing those less able to
purchase a hybrid to pay the community costs.
Furthermore, the credits on the more expensive hybrid-type vehicles coupled with
the depreciation deductions permitted on heavier (and more expensive) SUVs amounts to
a double jolt of inequity, which is imposed upon the purchaser of the non-hybrid-type
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vehicle that is often less expensive than the comparable hybrid vehicle and most likely
less expensive than a vehicle for which depreciation deductions are allowed due to
weight.
The inequity is further identified when one perceives the situation through
horizontal and vertical equity lenses. From a tax policy perspective, it does not seem
reasonable to tax two persons with the same economic situations in different manners.
This stems from the belief in the correlation between benefits derived from government
and income/wealth.109 The current tax situation, which is continued through the proposed
Energy Bill and National Energy Policy, promotes inequity by granting tax credits to
those who purchase hybrid-type vehicles and no benefit is granted to persons of equal
economic power who do not make the purchase. Although this inequity is not great due to
the low value of the current and proposed credits $3,000 and potentially only $1,000,110
the inequity is multiplied by the vertical inequity that abounds when one considers tax
deductions available to purchasers of certain light trucks and SUVs and the hybrid-type
credits available to purchasers of such vehicles. In most cases, both qualifying light
trucks/SUVs and hybrid-type vehicles will cost more than similar vehicles and the credit
creates the effect of taxing the purchaser of a less expensive vehicle more especially in
light of the fact that the common arrangement is that persons with less economic capacity
purchase less expensive vehicles. One with greater economic capacity should be taxed at
a rate proportionately higher than one with less capability.
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V.

CONCLUSION

In the American consumption economy, which is driven so much by current
trends, it is difficult to determine whether tax credits and incentives are truly beneficial to
the problems of energy dependence and emissions pollution. Even though the National
Energy Policy claims “it is clear that the lack of a comprehensive energy policy has
environmental costs”111 and that environmental concerns are amongst the highest
priorities in cultivating a sustainable energy plan, the provisions of the policy and those
of the Energy Policy Act of 2003 prevent a coherent approach. The programs are
comprehensive in their hypocrisy and duplicative in their oratory commentary.
Thus, a truly holistic and comprehensive energy policy that promotes both
security based energy needs and environmental concerns will not be brought forth from
the current scheme.

It will only develop from a concerted effort amongst

environmentalists, the automotive industry, the energy industry, Congress and the
Presidential administration. And, the tax structure cannot be parsed together piece-meal
if the policy goal of increased vehicle efficiency is to stand any chance of being realized.
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